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I. Introduction 
• 
The most significant demographic trends in the United States reflect 
the "greying" of our population. In 1900, 3.1 million Americans (4% of 
the population) were over the age of sixty-five. 1 By 1998, that figure had 
increased to 34~4 million,2 and by 2010, the over-sixty-five population 
will be 40.1 million, 13.3 percent of the nation.3 More than 70 million 
Americans will join the ranks of the elderly in the next twenty years.4 
Moreover, the "old-old," those over eighty-five, are increasing even faster 
than seniors as a whole. 5 
Family law practice includes many points of intersection between tradi-
tional doctrine and the elderly. The practitioner often confronts the same 
issues when representing older and younger clients, but the fortner present 
special needs. This article surveys some of the challenges presented by 
this increasing representation of the elderly and their families. The law in 
these subject areas is conceptually complex and changes frequently. Often 
expertise in allied topics bankruptcy, disability law, insurance, etc. is 
required. The task is formidable, but legal services well perforn1ed bring 
the incalculable reward of helping clients with disparate needs. 
II. Economic Issues 
A. Spousal Liability for Health & Institutional Care Costs 
Today, more elderly persons are living long enough to experience 
chronic illnesses and conditions, such as arthritis, heart disease, and senile 
dementia.6 Large amounts of family resources are consumed by health 
and long-tertn care costs in the last years of life. 7 Despite the popular view 
1. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH HUMAN SERVS., ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, Profile of Older 
Americans, available at http://www .aoa.gov /prof/Statistics/profile/profiles2002.asp [here-
inafter ADMINISTRATION ON AGING] . 
2. /d. 
3. Susan Levine, Aging Baby Boomers Pose Challenge: Preparations Needed for Coming 
Strain on Services, Census Reports Says, WASH. PosT, May 21, 1996, at A09. 
4. Donna Jackel, TV Show, Call-in Offer Caregivers Help, DEMOC. & CHRON (Rochester 
N.Y.), Oct. 9, 2002, at 4B, available at 2002 WL100997674. 
5. See ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, supra note 1 (stating that population sixty-five years and 
older projected to grow from 34.4 million to 70.1 million, while population eighty-five years 
and older projected to grow from 4 million to 8.9 million). 
6. "Older people accounted for 40% of all hospital stays and 49% of all days of care in hos-
pitals in 1995." KIMBERLEY DAYTON, ET AL. , ELDER LAW: READINGS, CASES AND MATERIALS 12 
(2d ed. 2003). In that year "[e]lder persons averaged more contacts with doctors . .. than did 
persons under 65 ( 11.1 contacts vs. 5 contacts)." I d. 
7. /d. at 7. Although 1.4 million or 4% "of the 65+ population lived in nursing homes in 
1995, the percentage increased dramatically with age, ranging from 1 percent for persons 65-74 
years to 5 percent for persons 75-84 years and 15 percent for persons 85+." ADMINISTRATION 
ON AGING, supra note 1. 
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that seniors' medical needs are provided by Medicare, it is estimated that 
when expenses are totaled, Medicare pays less than 50%.8 A major finan-
cial issue for older clients is payment of these health-care costs. 
English common law obligated husbands to support their wives fman-
cially in return for "services."9 Modern statutes and decisions have rewritten 
this obligation in gender-neutral terms so that today both spouses have recip-
rocal support obligations. 10 Under the venerable doctrine of "necessaries," 
if one spouse fails to supply the other with articles or services reasonably 
appropriate for support, and a third party supplies these necessaries, the 
non purchasing spouse is liable for their cost. 11 The doctrine is applied to 
both husbands and wives. 12 
Often the spouse treated or served by providers doctors, hospitals, 
nursing homes, etc. has insufficient resources to meet the debts incurred. 
Delinquent accounts are turned over to collection agencies and when pay-
ment is not made, legal proceedings ensue against the nontreated spouse. 
In this situation, statutes and court decisions in many states impose finan-
cial liability on the nontreated spouse under the necessaries doctrine. 
Whether termed "family expense" laws 13 or given some other title, this 
legislation often makes spouses jointly and severally liable. 14 Arizona goes 
so far as to make it a crime for a married person with means not to provide 
for his or her spouse's necessaries. 15 
Many state courts also have provided relief for medical and institutional 
providers of services under this doctrine.16 The debtor spouse is commonly 
8. Lynn Etheredge, Three Streams, One River: A Coordinated Approach to Financing 
Retirement, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS 80, 82 (Jan.-Feb. 1999). 
9. See Manby v. Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781, 784 (1659) (husbands are bound by the common 
law to provide for and maintain their wives). 
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Jun. LAw§ 412 (McKinney 1999) ("A married person is chargeable with 
the support of his or her spouse .... "); VA. CODE ANN. § 55·31 (1999) ("The doctrine of nec-
essaries as it existed in common law shall apply equally to both spouses .... "). 
11. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,§ 7.3 
at 444- 45 (2d ed. 1987). 
12. Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344, 1347 (N.H. 1995) (finding equal pro-
tection violation and extending the doctrine to both sexes); St. Francis Reg' 1 Med. Ctr., Inc. v. 
Bowles, 836 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Kan. 1992) (holding that both spouses are liable for the neces-
sary expenses incurred by either spouse and medical services are considered necessaries). 
13. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/15(a)(l) (2003). 
14. See, e.g., D.C. CoDE ANN.§ 46-601 (1998); HAw. REv. STAT.§ 572-24 (2003); LA. C1v. 
CoDE ANN. art. 2372 (West 2003); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. l9A, § 1652 (West 2003); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 209, § 1 (2003); MINN. STAT.§ 519.05 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. 123.090 (2003); 
N.Y. JuD. CT. Acrs LAW§ 412 (2003); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3103.02 (West 2003); TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.501 (Vernon 2003). 
15. ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 13-3610 1(2003). 
16. See, e.g., St. Joseph Hosp. of Nashua v. Rizzo, 676 A.2d 98 (N.H. 1996) (applying the 
doctrine and allowing the provider to collect); Bethany Med. Ctr. v. N'yazi, 890 P.2d 349 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 1995); St. Frances Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bowles, 836 P.2d 123 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). 
See generally Husband & W1[e § 196, 41 AM. JuR. 2d (2002). 
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primarily liable and the nondebtor spouse secondarily liable. 17 In California, 
if the debtor spouse has died, the living spouse is liable to the extent of his/ 
her share of the community property and the deceased spouse's property that 
passes through intestacy or by will. 18 The obligation to pay health-care costs 
may exist, even though spouses are separated, 19 if divorce papers were 
filed at the time of treatment or the parties were later divorced.20 Some 
states allow specific defenses.21 
A crushing economic burden may thus be placed upon the nontreated 
or noninstitutionalized spouse. Almost half of American workers have no 
pension coverage beyond Social Security, so assets are often few. 22 Many 
of these seniors lived through the Great Depression and times of great 
hardships. Bankruptcy and large debt is often foreign and frightening to 
them. Nevertheless, their health-related expenses force them to confront 
unpleasant choices. 
17. See, e.g., Porter Meml. Hosp. v. Wozniak, 680 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Ind. App. 1997) (holding 
that husband is potentially secondarily liable for the medical expenses of wife under doctrine of 
necessaries); Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344, 1347 (N.H. 1995) (holding that 
husband is secondarily liable for the necessary medical services provided to his wife under doc-
trine of necessaries, but only to extent that resources of wife are insufficient to satisfy debt); N.C. 
Baptist Hosps. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471, 473 (N.C. 1987) (holding that doctrine of necessaries 
is applicable to medical services provided to either spouse); Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 
A.2d 1145, 1150 (R.I. 1994) (fmding that medical expenses are characterized as "necessaries" 
within the spirit of the doctrine of necessaries); Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326, 
327 (Wis. 1982) (discussing that wife shares with her husband a limited legal duty of support of 
the family, this includes liability for necessary medical expenses incurred by either spouse). 
18. CAL. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 721 (West Supp. 2004). 
19. See generally VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-37 (Michie 2003); Forsyth Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. 
Chisolm, 467 S.E.2d 88 (N.C. 1996); Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 
1993) (disallowing the separation defense); Mem'l Hosp. of Alamance County, Inc. v. Brown, 
274 S.E.2d 277 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). 
20. See Mercy Health Sys. Corp. v. Gauss, 639 N.W.2d 803 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (follow-
ing the doctrine when the spouses were still married at the time services were provided, but sub-
sequently divorced); Trident Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Evans, 454 S.E.2d 343 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) 
(court found spouse liable for debts since the couple was married at the time of the services); 
Aker v. Fort Wayne Urology Corp., 562 N.E.2d 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the death 
of the husband did not excuse the wife from liability); St. Mary's Med. Ctr. v. Brody, 519 N.W.2d 
326 (Wis. 1982) (disallowing defense of separation and holding forn1er wife liable for services 
rendered to husband during marriage); Marshfield Clinic v. Disher, 314 N.W.2d 326 (Wis. 1982) 
(following the doctrine that a wife is still liable for husband's debts even after he dies). 
21. Montana, for example, provides an abandonment defense to its statutory duty. MoNT. 
CoDE ANN. § 50-9-106 (1997); Balyeat Collection Prof[ v. Garland, 51 P.3d 1127, 1129 (Mont. 
2002). In Mississippi a nondebtor spouse is not liable unless there was an express agreement to 
pay. Govan v. Med. Credit Serv., 621 S.2d 928 (Miss. 1993). 
22. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PREsENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED DEFINED BENEAT PLANs (JCX-71-02, 2002), at 28 (stating that 56% of full-time private-
sector employees have an employer-sponsored pension plan). There are significant variations in 
pension plan coverage among racial groups. See Yung-Ping Chen & Thomas D. Leavitt, The 
Widening Gap Between White and Minority Pension Coverage, Ptmuc PoucY & AGING 82 (2001). 
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A 1999 study revealed that nearly half of bankruptcy filings listed med-
ical costs as the reason for the filing. Elderly and female-headed households 
were more likely to have health-related bankruptcies than the rest of the 
population.23 The same study found that 80% of those filing bankruptcies for 
health reasons were unable to meet obligations even though they had some 
form of medical insurance prior to the filing. Family law practitioners rep-
resenting spouses in this situation should consider bankruptcy proceedings 
under appropriate circumstances.24 Under chapter 7, nonexempt assets are 
sold or used to repay all or a portion of the debts owed, and the debtor retains 
rights to future income substantially clear of past debts.25 Under chapter 13, 
the debtor is required to make continuing payments, generally for three to 
five years, but is allowed to keep most of the assets held at the time of filing. 26 
A common bankruptcy problem for these clients, whether their debts 
are related to medical costs or not, is that they often have substantial equity 
in their home and risk losing it. Often seniors' mortgage payments are low 
or their house may be completely paid for. In addition to providing eco-
nomical shelter, the home is a source of comfort and security. When both 
spouses are liable for the debt and there is equity beyond the statutory 
exemptions in chapter 7, the trustee will sell the house. 
In such situations, a chapter 13 bankruptcy can provide some relief, but 
may also create problems. Assume, for example, the debtors have $70,000 
of equity in their home because they have been paying on their mortgage for 
a long time. In states such as Indiana, where debtors can protect only $15,000 
of equity, they must .file a plan that ensures the creditors at least the lesser of 
the nonexempt equity or 100% of the debt. 27 Furthennore, these debtors may 
not have sufficient total income to meet the bankruptcy obligation. To save 
their homes, seniors may use Social Security or other pensions exempt in 
bankruptcy, but income for nom1alliving expenses may now be insufficient. 
A chapter 13 plan can continue for no more than five years. 
Some creative solutions are worth considering for elderly clients in these 
circumstances. First, debtors may remortgage their properties during the 
23. Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking the Debates Over Health Care Financing: Evidence 
From the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 377 (2001). 
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1-1330. Since only one bankruptcy may be filed in six years, this should be 
used when other options are unavailable. Careful consideration must be given to how the exist-
ing assets are held, e.g., as tenancy by entirety, joint tenants with right of survivorship, etc./d. 
25. 11 U.S.C. § 727 et seq. See generally Robyn L. Meadows, Bankruptcy Reform and the 
Elderly: The Effect of Means-Testing on Older Debtors, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 227, 232 (2000). 
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (contents of plan); 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (duration of plan). 
27. 11 U.S.C. § l325(a)(4). This is known as the "Best Interest of Creditors" test. See, e.g., 
In re Jones, 301 B.R. 840 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003); In re Dewey, 237 B.R. 783 (B.A.P. lOth 
Cir. 1999); In re Doman, 103 B.R. 61 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Chapman, 51 B.R. 663 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1985). 
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chapter 13 bankruptcy, using that e_quity to produce a lower overall payment 
and meeting the minimum dividend required by law for creditors. Second, 
"reverse" mortgages enable debtors to borrow a lump sum from the home's 
equity without the obligation to repay it. Creditors thus receive their 
required dividend, and the debtors end up with either an existing mortgage 
payment or no payment at all if their properties are paid up. The reverse 
mortgage accumulates interest that is due upon the death of the debtor~ 
B. Intergenerational Support Duties 
1. ADULT CHILD-PARENT 
Although some elderly persons are wealthy, many others are not. In 1997, 
one out of every six people over sixty ... five, or 17%, was poor or near poor.28 
In 1999, thirty-two million, representing 34% of all older persons, reported 
an income of less than $1 0,000; only 23% earned $25,000 or more.29 The 
median income reported was $14,425. Despite income deprivation, older 
. . 
households are less likely than younger households to receive public assis-
tance, food stamps, or have members covered by Medicaid.30 
The duty of parents in every state to support minor children financially is 
well-known to family law practitioners. Far less known are statutes in thirty 
states, which impose a duty on adult children to provide fmancial assistance 
to their indigent parent.31 The fmancial need of the elderly parent, which trig-
gers the duty, is usually phrased in general tenns, e.g., ''unable to maintain" 
self.32 The obligation of the adult child is described in various ways: to pro-
vide "necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attention,"33 "necessaries,"34 
"medical expenses; "35 or "burial expenses. "36 In some states, this duty is 
28. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME 60-200 
(Sept. 199_8). 
29. About 3.4 million seniors, representing 10.5% of the population, were below official def-
initions of poverty in 1997. Another 2.1 million, or 6.4% of the elderly, were classified as "near-
poor." ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, A PROALE OF 
OLDER AMERICANS (2000), available at http://www .aoa.gov/aoa/-stats/profile/profile2000.html 
(hereinafter PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS]~ 
30. One-third or 31% of older renter households lived in publicly owned or subsidized hous-
ing in 1994, as compared to 14% for younger renters) additional indicia ofpoverty. PROALE ·Of 
OLDER AMERICANS, supra note 29. 
31. See Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy 
Considerations, 10 BRKLN.J. LAw & PoL'Y 709 (1999) (Appendix A, listing all statutes). 
32. State statutes utilizing such "unable to maintain" language include Alaska, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,. Pennsylvania, 
and South Dakota. 
33. States with this language include Indiana, Montana, and South Dakota. 
34. States with "ne_cessaries" language include California, Connecticut, Maryland, 
Mississippi, and Ohio. 
35. States with "medical expenses" language include Nevada and Tennessee. 
36. States with "burial expenses" language include Alaska; Indiana, Montana, and West Virginia. 
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even extended to grandchildren.37 Because relatively few cases invoking 
these statutes are reported in appellate court decisions38 and trial court cases 
are rarely published, enforcement of these state statutes is difficult to gauge. 
Economic support of the elderly is both a private and a public matter, 
however. Less punitive and likely more successful policies would be fed-
eral and state laws and programs that encourage family members to support 
elderly parents when feasible and reward them for doing so. Public subsidies 
for a variety of needs- -·day care, respite care, caretaking tasks, housing to 
enable multigenerational families to live together, promoting "teleworking" 
by family caretakers would foster recognition that family and society 
share responsibility for the aged. 
2. GRANDPARENT SUPPORT DUTIES 
The Elizabethan poor laws required grandparents to support grandchil-
dren. These laws were transported to the colonies,39 but American common 
law developed the opposite principle.40 Generally, grandparents were not 
financially responsible for grandchildren. Child support proceedings were 
to be undertaken against parents, but not grandparents.41 An exception 
was typically made when the grandparent acted in place of parents on 
behalf of the grandchild.42 
In 1996, the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program was abolished and replaced by the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA).43 The 
37. These states include Alaska, Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, and Utah. 
38. These cases are collected in Seymour Moskowitz, Adult Children and Indigent Parents, 
86 MARQ. L. REv. 401, 422 n.ll7 (2002). 
39. Laura W. Morgan, Family Law at 2000: Private and Public Support of the Family: 
From Welfare State to Poor Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 705, 706-07 (1999). See generally Richard 
Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under American Poor Laws, 54 MICH. L. REv. 497 (part 1), 
54 MICH. L. REV. 607 (part IT) (1956). 
40. See, e.g. , In re Gollahon, 707 N.E.2d 735, 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) ("Parent, not grand-
parents, are responsible for the children's custody, care, education, nurture, and support."); 
Blaloch v. Blaloch, 559 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (holding that there is no com-
mon law requirement that grandparents provide support for their grandchildren). 
41. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Miranda, 715 A.2d 680, 687 (Conn. 1998) ("general obligations 
of parenthood entail the duty to supply necessary food, clothing and medical care.''); Dubroc v. 
Dubroc, 388 So. 2d 377, 380 (La. 1980) (explaining that child support duty is imposed by fact 
of maternity or paternity); Wilsey v. Wilsey, 831 P.2d 590,592 (Mont. 1992) (stating that child 
support is a social and moral obligation of parents). 
42. E.g., Ex parte Lipscomb, 660 So. 2d 986, 988 (Ala. 1994) (stating that a nonparent who 
stands in loco parentis to a child may be held responsible for the child's support); Bennett v. 
Bennett, 390 S.E.2d 276, 278 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that grandparents stood in loco par-
entis to grandchild when mother relinquished, in writing and before a notary, all claims, right 
of custody, and parental control over her child, and expressly consented to the appointment of 
child's grandmother as guardian). 
43. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-93, 110 Stat. 2105. 
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PRWORA amended 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) by adding ,paragraph 18: 
Enforcement of orders against paternal or maternal grandparents procedures 
under which, at the state's option, any child support order enforced under this 
part with respect to a child of minor parents, if the custodial parent of such child 
is receiving assistance under the state program under part A of this subchapter, 
shall be enforceable, jointly and severally, against the parents of the non-cus-
todial parent .of such child.44 
Congress thus encouraged states receiving federal funds for child support 
enforcement efforts to enact statutes making grandparents fiscally liable 
for their grandchildren. Minors who have children have a duty to support 
the child financially. Since these adolescents are often in school or other-
wise unable to meet that obligation, the state may enforce the court order, 
jointly and severally, against the grandparents.45 At least thirteen states have 
enacted statutes providing for grandparent liability for child support.46 
Legislation holding grandparents financially responsible for the support 
of their grandchildren in theory should motivate parents to teach their 
teens about birth control, abstinence, and the dangers of pregnancy.47 
Grandparents may sue their grandchild's parents for reimbursement.48 
3. LONG-TERM CAREGIVING 
Most older clients desire to remain at home or at least outside a nursing 
home.49 Family support enables most of them to remain in the community 
44. /d. at § 373. 
45. See, e.g., Whitman v. Kiger, 533 S.E.2d 807 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing that primary 
responsibility for an infant born to unemancipated minors is placed on the minors' parents, even if 
minors' parents do not assume such responsibility in writing); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 50-13..4(b) (1999). 
46. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 25-8l0(A) (West 2000); IDAHO CODE§ 32-706(4) (Michie 1996 
& Supp. 2000); 305 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-10 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); Mo. CoDE ANN. 
FAM. LAW § 5-203(c) (Michie 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 454.400(2)(16) (West Supp. 2000); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 167:3-a (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 50-l3.4(b) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 31 09.19(B)(l) (West Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws 15-5-16.2(g) (1996 & Supp. 1999); 
S.C. CooE ANN. § 20-7-936 (West Supp. 1999); S.D. CoOIAED LAWS § 25-5-18.2 (Michie 
1999); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 49.90(l)(a)(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); Wvo. STAT. ANN.§ 42-2-
103(e) (Michie 1999). See generally Laura W. Morgan, Fork It Over, Granny: The Child 
Support Obligations of Grandparents, 11 (7) DIVORCE LmG. 129 (July 1999). 
47. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 
supra note 43, at§§ 101(3) ("Promotion of responsible fatherhood and motherhood is integral 
to successful child rearing and the well-being of children;') & 101(10). Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (" ... it 
is the sense of Congress that prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and reductions in out-of-
wedlock birth are very important Government interests ... "). 
48. See, e.g., Stiefelmeyer v. Stiefelmeyer, 485 So. 2d 729,730 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (hold-
ing that grandmother who sought child support modification against father of child prevailed by 
showing significant change in circumstances that affect the welfare of the child). 
49. A survey done by the American Association of Retired Persons reports that 85 o/o of the 
respondents prefer to remain in their own homes if the need for care arises. JOHN MIGLIACCIO & 
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rather than being institutionalized. 5° An estimated twenty-two million house-
holds currently provide care for an older or disabled relative;51 approxi-
mately two-thirds of those providing care for elders are employed. 52 More 
than 80% of all care provided to older persons53 is provided by family 
members or other volunteer caregivers_ in the home, a fact that has important 
implications regarding gender-related roles in American society. 54 Typically 
women find themselves bearing the multiple responsibilities of rearing 
children, working for income outside the home, and providing care for aging 
family members.55 This often results in devastating consequences for the 
female caregiver, including lost employment opportunities, fmancial strain, 
and emotional stress. 56 Indeed, one of the reasons elderly women are more 
likely to be in poverty than are their male cohorts is that their pension ben-
efits and assets from employment have been decreased by years out of the 
workforce caring for family members. 
Working caregivers incur "significant losses in career development, 
salary, and retirement income, and substantial out-of-pocket expenses as 
a result of their caregiying obligations."57 The average lifetime loss of 
wealth wages, private pension, and Social Security benefits experienced 
NEAL E. CUTLER, CARING TODAY, PLANNING FOR TOMORROW 14 (1999) available at http://www. 
caregi ving.org/nacguide. pdf. 
50~ MARLA BERG-WEGER, CARING FOR ELDERLY PARENTS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
STRESS AND CHOICE 10 (Stuart Bruchey ed. 1996). 
51. Mary Beth Franklin, On-The-Job Aid for Caregivers, KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL FIN. MAG., 
August 1, 2001, available at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/ml318/8_55n6577547/pl/ 
article.jhtml. 
52. Katherine Elizabeth Ulrich, Insuring Family Risks: Suggestions for a National Family 
Policy and Wage Replacement, 14 YALE J.L. & FEM. 1, 6 (2002) (citing U.S. Dep't of Labor, 
Futurework: Trends & Challenges for Work in the 2ls't Century 28, 33 (1999). 
53. Although the care needed is, of course, individualized, the vast majority is assistance 
with activities of daily living such as bathing, dressing, housecleaning, cooking~ transportation, 
and the like. 
54. BERG-WEGER, supra note 50, at 3. 
55. WOMEN AND AGING: BEARING THE BURDEN OF LONG-.'TERM CARE: JOINT HEARING BEFORE 
THE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING & THE SUBCOMM., ON AGING OF THE COMM. ON HEALTH, 
EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS IN THE U.S., 107TH CONG. 22 (2002), available at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate22shl07.html. See, e-.g., ELAINE M. BRODY, 
WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE: THEIR PARENT-CARE YEARS 29 (2003). See also ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, 
THE SECOND SHIFf (1989). 
56. As one commentator explains: "The most severe impact of caring for a dependent adult 
appears to be that it is totally monopolizing and without rest, twenty-four hours a day, seven 
days a week,, 365 days a year •. ., There is gradually isolation .... of the main care giver." Nancy 
Guber1nan, The Family, Women and Caring: Who Cares for the Careers?; 17 RESOURCES FOR 
FEMINISTS RES. 37, 39 (1988). See also THE METLIFE JUGGLING Acr STUDY: BALANCING 
CAREGIVING WITii WORK AND THE COSTS INVOLVED (November 1999) at http:// www.caregiv-
ing.org/JugglingStudy.pdf (estimating 10% of all family caregivers left the- paid workforce 
entirely) [hereinafter JuGGLING STUDY}. See generally BERG-WEGER, supra note 50. 
57. JUGGLING STUDY, supra note 56, at 3. 
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by caregivers is estimated to be $659,139.58 Ten percent of caregivers 
report leaving the workforce completely, 11% take leaves of absence from 
their employment, and 7% reduce their hours from full-time to part-time or 
take a less demanding job.59 The economic value of the services provided 
by these family members would be $200 billion per year if provided by 
professionals.60 The average duration of caregiving is four and a half years;61 
10% provided care for ten years or more. Moreover, these caregivers often 
spend their own money providing assistance to elderly relatives.62 
Family support enables 95% of seniors to remain in the community 
instead of an institutional placement.63 Another advantage of such infor-
mal caregiving is the increased autonomy of the aging family member. 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the perception of personal control 
plays a critical role in an individual's long-tertn physical and emotional 
health.64 Even relatively simple decision making, such as choice of food 
and activity, leads to improved quality of life.65 
Given the prevalence and importance of this nonprofessional care, family 
members often require infortnation and counseling from lawyers regarding 
legal rights available to them. The federal Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) provides many employees with up to twelve weeks of unpaid, 
job-protected leave per year to care for a newborn child or immediate 
family member (spouse, child, or parent) with a serious health condition.66 
Employees taking an FMI.~A leave are entitled to be restored to their original 
position or to a similar position with equivalent "benefits, pay and other 
terms and conditions of employment."67 The Act helps employees balance 
work and family responsibilities but its provisions are quite restrictive. 
Numerous exceptions leave many employees uncovered.68 Leave from the 
job for care of nondesignated relatives, e.g., grandparent, parent-in-law, etc., 
58. /d. at 6. 
59. THE METLIFE STUDY OF EMPLOYER COSTS FOR WORKING CAREGIVERS I (1997) available 
at http://www .caregiving.org/metlife.pdf. 
60. THE METLIFE STUDY OF EMPLOYED CAREGIVERS: DOES LONG TERM CARE INSURANCE 
MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 1 (2001) available at http://www.caregiving.org/L TC%20study%20fmal.pdf. 
61. The study also found that 21% have provided care for five to nine years, and 1 Oo/o have pro-
vided care for 10 years or more. FAMILY CAREGIVING IN THE U.S.: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL 
SURVEY 12 (1997) available at http://www .caregiving.org/finalreport.pdf. 
62. Those who actually record expenses estimate that they spend $171.00 per month on such 
caregiving. /d. at 24. 
63. BERG-WEGER, supra note 50, at 10. 
64. Brian F. Hofland, Autonomy in Long-Term Care: Background Issues and a 
Programmatic Response, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 3, 5-6 (1988); Judith Rodin, Aging and Health: 
Effects of the Sense of Control, 233 SciENCE 1271 ( 1986). 
65. /d. 
66. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2000). 
67. /d. at§ 2614(a)(l)(A)(B). 
68. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(1) (FMLA applies only to employers with ftfty or more employees). 
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is not protected. Since a maximum of only twelve workweeks is allowed, 
the leave usually cannot meet the long-tertn care needs of most elderly 
and/or disabled persons. 
The critical deficiency of the FMLA, however, is that even middle-class 
caregivers cannot survive or maintain their standards of living without pay. 
A Department of Labor survey in 2000 indicated about three quarters of 
those who needed to take leave to provide care for relatives were unable 
to do so because they could not afford to go without pay. 69 Many were 
also afraid a leave would have a negative impact on their careers.70 An 
alternative to the FMLA is employer-provided assistance to family care-
givers, including employer-paid consultation and referral programs, and 
employee-paid Iong-ter1n-care-insurance plans.71 Only a minority of 
employers are this family-friendly. 
Because the FMLA does not preempt state laws that provide better 
family leave benefits, practitioners should investigate rights under indi-
vidual state statutes, which provide more realistic assistance to caregivers 
and the elderly. Hawaii, for example, at the discretion of the employee, 
allows the use of accumulated sick leave in addition to unpaid leave to 
care for family members.72 Washington has recently adopted a new statute 
allowing workers to use paid sick leave, personal days, and vacation time 
to care for family members.73 The most progressive step, effective July 
2004, was taken by California in expanding the state disability insurance 
program to allow employees to receive half their salary for up to six 
weeks in order to take time off to care for a child or sick relative.74 But 
even these state initiatives are minor in comparison to the problem. 
Very few public sources of monetary compensation are available to fam-
ily caregivers. Federal Medicare programs make almost no provision for the 
long-tertn custodial care needed by the elderly and reimburse few services 
in the home, both glaring deficiencies.75 Our clients fare no better under 
69. See DAVID CANTOR ET AL., U.S. 0Ep'T OF LABOR, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES 
AND EMPLOYERS: THE fAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS 2000, UPDATE 2-16, TABLE 2.17: 
REASONS FOR NOT TAKING LEAVE 1995 & 2000 SURVEYS (2001) available at http://wWw. 
dol.gov/asp/fmla/chapter2.pdf. [hereinafter, FMLA SURVEYS 2000 UPDATE] (77.6% of leave-
needers could not afford to take leave). 
70. /d. ( 42.8o/o of leave-needers thought job advancement might be hurt, 27.8% did not want 
to lose seniority, 31.9% thought their job might be lost). 
71. Robert E. O'Toole, Integrating Contributory Elder-Care Benefits with Voluntary Long-
Term Care Insurance Programs, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J., Dec. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 
15846972. 
72. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN§ 398-4 (2002). See also 2003 CoNN. Acrs 213 (REG. SESs.). 
73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 49.12.270 (West 2003). 
74. S.B. 1661, 2002 LEG., 2001-02 SESs. (Cal. 2002). The maximum payout is $728.00 per week. 
75. Medicare will finance skilled licensed nursing and therapy services, but these are typi-
cally not provided by relatives. MIGLIACCO & CUTLER, supra note 49, at 14. NATHAN L LINSK, 
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state-administered Medicaid. First, there are stringent fmancial eligibility 
guidelines; state funding is thus unavailable for many middle-class clients, 
at least without considerable time for drafting and executing a sophisticated 
Medicaid planning strategy. Second, like Medicare, Medicaid provides 
little support for home healthcare. Payment to relatives is almost impossi-
ble because of the very restrictive definition of "personal care services"76 
and the bias toward funding institutional care.77 A few states have initiated 
programs to compensate caregivers providing services to the elderly or 
disabled in their homes. Florida and Minnesota provide direct funding to 
such caregivers.78 Arizona allows taxpayers who provide in-home care for 
an elderly parent a $10,000 exemption on the caregiver's state income tax.79 
An alternative to public funding is private long-tertn-care insurance, 
although the cost of premiums often deters purchase. Long-tertn-care 
insurance policies require intense study and analysis by the lawyer who 
must be able to communicate complex provisions to the lay client.. 
Important choices must be made regarding benefits per day, benefit period, 
home-care coverage, and many other topics. Often, the cost of insuring 
both the husband and wife is not feasible. 
Another alternative is for the dependent senior to compensate the family 
caregiver. In most situations there will be a natural disinclination by the 
caregiver to ask for compensation directly. Moreover, the dependent senior 
ET AL., COMPENSATION OF FAMILY CARE FOR THE ELDERLY, FAMILY CAREGIVING IN AN AGING 
SoCIETY 64, 74 (Rosalie Kane & Joan D. Penrod, eds, 1995). 
76. Medicaid regulations provide that "personal care services" are: 
[S]ervices furnished to an individual who is not an inpatient or resident of a hospital, 
nursing facility, intennediate care facility for the mentally retarded, or institution for 
mental disease that are: (1) Authorized for the individual by a physician in accordance 
with a plan of treatment or (at the option of the State) otheiWise authorized for the indi-
vidual in accordance with a service plan approved by the State; (2) Provided by an indi-
vidual who is qualified to provide such services and who is not a member of the individ-
ual's family; and (3) Furnished in a home, and at the State's option, in another location. 
42 C.P.R. § 440.167(a) (200 1) (emphasis added). 
77. Craig S. Meuser, Symposium: Long-Term Care for the Elderly: Why Government and 
Business Should Take a Closer Look at Adult Day Care, 1 QuiNNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 219, 239-
41 (1997) (discussing the disconnect between health care needs and Medicaid funding rules). 
The nature of illness in the U.S. has now shifted from a preponderance of acute care illnesses 
to a preponderance of chronic ailments and conditions. In fact, treatment of chronic conditions is 
the fastest growing and highest cost segment of the health care system. Nevenheless, the Medicaid 
program funds nursing home care much more than community alternatives like adult day care .... 
See also William G. Weissert et al., Cost Savings from Home and Community-Based 
Services: Arizona's Capitated Medicaid Long· Term Care Program, 22 J. HEALTH PoL'Y & LAW 
1329 ( 1997) (detailing substantial Medicaid savings achieved by promoting extensive home and 
community-based care services as an alternative to institutional care). 
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.5601 (2003). Home Care for the Elderly Act, and implementing 
regulations, 58 FLA. ADMIN. CODE. 58 H-1.002-04; MINN. STAT. S 256B.51 ( 1-3) (2003). 
79. ARiz. REv. STAT.§ 43-1023(c) (2003). 
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may not have disposable income available to pay the relative. An option is 
to allocate a share of the senior's estate to the caregiver. Although contracts 
to will property in exchange for services are valid, probate codes often 
require express reference in the will to the contract and extrinsic evidence 
proving its tenns. 80 Typically, services are provided without written contract, 
which may leave the caregiver without remedy after death of the senior.81 
The family law practitioner may play an important role in this situation. The 
attorney must ensure there is no overreaching, which in some cases may 
amount to financial exploitation. 
Careful legal counseling and drafting is required because a minefield of 
precedent and interrelated doctrines confront the caregiver. Courts in most 
states presume that services provided by family members have been ren-
dered without expectation of payment82 if there is no express contract.83 
Even worse, the values that motivate caregiving family members and 
others love, intimacy, nurturing may actually disadvantage them later. 
"Courts frequently translate acts of care into evidence that the one-caring 
unduly influenced the cared-for, or, worse yet, courts use caring acts to 
support a presumption of undue influence."84 
In addition, procedural stumbling blocks abound. Often an estate 
claimant must demonstrate by "clear, convincing, and satisfactory evi-
dence" that an express or implied agreement existed to compensate the 
caregiver for services rendered.85 Failure to assert a claim until after the 
80. UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 2-514 (amended 1997). 
81. See, e.g., Kohler v. Armstrong, 758 P.2d 407 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); In re Estate of Jesmer 
v. Rohlev, 609 N.E.2d 816 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); In re Estate of Rollins, 645 N.E.2d 1026 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1995); In re Estate of Lutz, 620 N.W.2d 589 (N.D. 2000); Smith v. Milligan, 43 Pa. 
107 ( 1862); Hall v. Finch, 29 Wis. 278 ( 1871 ). 
82. See, e.g., Matter of Estate of Wilson, 579 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (App. Div. 1991) (citing In 
re Adams Estate, 149 N.Y.S.2d 849 (App. Div. 1956); In re Schultz' Estate, 188 N.Y.S.2d 144 
(Sur. Ct. 1959); In re Basten's Estate, 126 N. Y .S.2d 459 (Sur. Ct. 1953). 
83. See, e.g., In re Clark's Estate, 267 NW. 273, 275 (Wis. 1936) "settled presumption that 
services rendered by "near" relatives by blood or marriage [who] reside together as one com-
mon family ... [are] intended as mutual acts of kindness done or furnished gratuitously." /d. 
(quoting In re Estate of Goltz, 238 N.W. 374, 376 (Wis. 1931 )). See generally Jonathan S. 
Henes, Compensating Caregiving Relatives: Abandoning the Family Member Rule in Contracts, 
17 CARDOZO L. REv. 715 (1996). See also Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 17, 18-20 
(Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the contractual claim of a spouse who, in exchange for her husband's 
oral promise to devise property to her, provided round-the-clock nursing care for her husband 
who wanted to live at home rather than in a nursing home after his stroke). 
84. Trent J. Thumley, Note, The Caring Influence: Beyond Autonomy as the Foundation of 
Undue Influence, ?liND. L. J. 513,514 (1996). See, e.g., 52 Estate of Beal, 796 P.2d 150, 152 
(Okla. 1989) (provision of services was "irresistible evidence ... [of] undue influence"). 
85. Fahringer v. Estate of Strine, 216 A. 2d 82, 85 (Pa. 1966) (" [T]raditionall y the courts 
have been reluctant to give recognition to such contracts and have viewed claims based on such 
contracts with misgivings and suspicion."). See also Eggers v. Rittscher, 529 N.W.2d 741, 744 
(Neb. 1995) ("We regard with grave suspicion any claim of an oral contract to convey property 
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decedent has died often weighs against the family caregiver. Theoretically, 
cohabiting but unmarried couples would have a better chance for compen-
sation since the presumption that services provided by family members 
were rendered gratuitously would not be applicable. But courts have 
blocked "family-like" cohabitants from recovering as well.86 
At least one state has enacted a statute that specifically allows a family 
member to make a claim against the estate of the decedent without an 
express contract if statutory requirements are met. In Illinois, a specified 
family member spouse, parent, brother, sister, or child of a disabled 
person who "dedicates himself ... to the care of the disabled person by 
living [with] and personally caring for [him/her] for at least three years ... 
[is] entitled to a claim against the estate.87 Claims may be made on the basis 
of lost employment or lifestyle opportunities, and emotional distress expe-
rienced as a result of personally caring for the disabled person. The claim 
is based on the nature and extent of the person's disability.88 The statute 
has limitations; by explicitly naming specific close relatives as potential 
claimants, others, e.g., nieces, nephews, grandchildren, etc., are excluded. 
Nor is there any statutory definition of "disability," which would trigger 
eligibility for compensation. Despite these limitations, the statue is a positive 
response to the all-too-common situation of relatives sacrificing portions of 
their lives in caregiving roles without an express contract for compensation. 
In the absence of a will, state intestate succession laws provide for prop-
erty to pass to a hierarchy of relatives, usually defined by blood, marriage 
or adoption. 89 These relatives inherit regardless of their conduct or their 
actual relationship to the decedent. This remains true even if the relative 
refused to care for, or even mistreated, the decedent.90 This extreme situation 
at death."); Thompson v. Henderson, 591 P.2d 784, 786 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that oral 
contracts to devise "are regarded with suspicion" and that "[t]he standard of proof in such cases 
is not 'a preponderance of the evidence' but rather, one of 'high probability' ")(citation omitted). 
Dead man's statutes have posed particular problems for contracts to devise. See, e.g., Farah v. 
Stout, 684 A.2d 471, 474-77 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). 
86. See Estate of Dodson, 878 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Women have not been 
allowed to recover for the value of services rendered where there had been no provision in the 
deceased's will, which provided for her. "(U]nlawful sexual intercourse is not considered con-
sideration, and a contract based upon such a relationship will not be enforced." JoHN T. 
GAUBATZ ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 207 (1993). But see 
Estate of Zent, 459 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1990) (surviving cohabiter had claim in quantum merit 
against estate for value of services rendered in expectation of compensation). For an extended 
discussion of the family services presumption and its applicability to nonrelated cohabitants as 
well as relatives, see In re Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 704-05 (Wis. 1980). 
87. 755 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-1.1. 
88. E.g., 100% disability allows a $100,000 claim, down to 25% disability, $25,000./d. 
89. See WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR., & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES§ 2.1 
at 42 (2d ed. 2001). 
90. Some jurisdictions disqualify spouses who abandoned the decedent, however. See, e.g., 
• 
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presents practitioners opportunities for law refortn. The law should deny 
benefits to those whose behavior makes them "unworthy heirs" and should 
encourage care giving within the family and society at large.91 Most of the 
abuse of the elderly is perpetrated by close relatives; 90% of abusers are 
family members, and two-thirds are the victim's adult children or spouses 
of those children.92 Where relatives have not provided support and care or 
have abused their parents, inheritance rights should be denied because of 
their conduct.93 Moreover, those who have assumed and carried out care 
responsibilities should be rewarded. This would add a financial incentive 
encouraging care of the elderly. 
California has moved in this direction, barring persons found guilty of 
elder abuse and neglect by clear and convincing evidence from inheriting 
from their deceased victims.94 The abuser is deemed to have died before 
the victim and thus unable to inherit.?5 The statute also bars persons from 
inheriting who have falsely imprisoned, endangered health, stolen property 
or caused pain or mental suffering to the testator.96 
4. PRENUPTIAL & COHABITANT AGREEMENTS 
A variety of legal and nonlegal issues are presented when a client, 
whose previous marriage has ended in death or divorce, establishes a new 
relationship. Often these clients are considering marriage to the new partner, 
and the lawyer is asked to create a prenuptial agreement. The enforceability 
of these contracts varies from state to state.97 The Unifottn Premarital 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) (excluding a spouse who "voluntarily 
leaves his or her spouse"). A few states also bar parents who abandoned or refused to support 
their children. See, e.g., N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRusTs LAW§ 4-1.4 (McKinney 1998) (disqual-
ifying a parent who failed or refused to provide for a minor child). See also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5(5) (1999) (barring a "parent 
who has refused to acknowledge or has abandoned his or her child, or a person whose parental 
rights have been tenninated"). 
91. See, e.g., Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be 
Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 257,259-61,265-73 (1994) (criticizing statutes that allow "dead-
beat dads" to inherit from their children); Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family 
Property: A Proposal for Reform, I 3 LAw & INEQUALITY 401, 439 ( 1995) (proposing a family 
violence statute "to deny abusers any [inheritance] benefits from those they abused"); Anne-
Marie E. Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are, Where We Need to Go, 
27 IND. L. REV. 517, 524-41 (I 994) (discussing refonn of intestate succession laws to prevent 
inheritance by parents who abandoned or failed to support their children). 
92. See National Center on Elder Abuse, The National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Pt 5, 
Conclusions, available at http://www .aoa.gov /eldfam/Elder _Rights/Eider_Abuse/ ABuseReport_ 
Full.pdf (September 1998). 
93. See generally Seymour Moskowitz, Golden Age in the Golden State, Contemporary 
Legal Developments in Elder Abuse and Neglect, 36 LoY. (LA) L. REv. 589, 652-56 (2003). 
94. CAL. PRos. CODE § 259 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002). See also Moskowitz, supra note 93. 
95. /d. 
96. /d. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 236, 368 (WEST 1999 & SuPP. 2002). 
97. See generally AMERICAN BAR Assoc. A IT ACKING AND DEFENDING MARITAL AGREEMENTS 
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Agreement98 has been adopted in more than half of the states and almost 
all of the remainder have rules governing these contracts .. 
The needs of older clients contemplating marriage may differ dramati-
cally from those of younger clients.99 Hostility and suspicion, for example, 
may be present between the elderly future stepparent and the adult step-
children due to fears concerning the statutorily mandated division of the 
estate after the death of the parent. If the parent(s) wishes to ensure that 
property passes to later generations, the prenuptial agreement must list and 
characterize this property and provide that these assets shall pass as pro-
vided in the will or the agreement itself. Children from previous marriages 
should be specifically acknowledged, and the agreement should provide that 
the spouse may transfer all or part of these separate assets to those children. 
Other legal issues of elderly clients planning to marry need to be 
addressed; e.g., domicile, waiver of rights to retirement benefits, obligations 
. . 
to children of prior marriages, tax considerations, and the marital resi-
dence.100 The family home may be a particularly sensitive issue because 
children or grandchildren may have anticipated living in it or selling it 
once the parent dies. The premarital agreement in these cases should specify 
whether the surviving spouse may continue to live in the home or dispose of 
it. Additionally, if one spouse is forfeiting rights as a result of the marriage, 
the loss can be recognized in the contract and the spouse compensated. 
Remarriage of a senior citizen might result in a number of negative fman-
cial consequences, e.g., loss of alimony from a fonner spouse or a prior 
prenuptial agreement, 101 tertnination of benefits from a trust or will, 102 or 
loss of Social Security benefits drawn on the record of a prior spouse.103 A 
well-drafted premarital agreement should resolve these matters. 
Cohabitation has emerged as an important and rapidly increasing new 
family fonn in the United States. Approximately 7% of the nation's couples 
are in now-unmarried committed relationships. 104 These relationships live 
in the "shadow of the law" and often have more legal needs than traditional 
ones. State-granted benefits and rules available to married couples in the 
areas of taxation, inheritance, divorce, employment and privacy rights, 
8.02 (2001); Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L~ & 
.. 
FEMINISM 229 (1994). 
98. UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT Acr, 98 U.L.A. 369 (1987 & Supp. 1999). 
99. See generally Randall Gingiss, Second Marriage Considerations for the Elderly, 45 
S.D.L. REv. 469 (2000). 
I 00. /d. at 469-90 (de_aling with these issues in depth). 
I 01. ld. at 490. 
102. /d. at 477-78. 
103. /d. at 469. 
104. See ARLENE F. SALUTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, 
SERIES, P. 20-484, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS, March 1994 Xiii (1996). 
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etc., must be established for unmarried elder couples through the use of 
advance planning documents and contracts. Decisions may include whether 
to combine or to keep property separate, treatment of pre-existing or later-
acquired debt, daily living issues such as division of household expenses or 
housework, plans for children, and who will take care of pets. The attor-
ney may encounter complex situations involving elders who do not have 
a life-partner but who want to treat friends as family in their legal plans. 
III. Health-Care Decision Making 
A substantial body of case law has been developed over the past three 
decades involving medical decision makin,g concerning denial or termi-
nation of life-sustaining medical treatment. Competent patients are almost 
universally given the right to make end-of-life decisions. 105 Both the U.S. 
Supreme Court and state courts have held this right does not end if the 
patient is no longer competent. 106 A frequent source of conflict; however, 
is the dilemma posed by patients without current decision-making capac-
ity who have not expressed their intent in advance or who have provided 
conflicting or ambiguous directions. This difficulty would be obviated in 
many cases by adherence to statutes that per1nit individuals, while they 
are competent, to execute an advance directive regardin-g their future 
treatment wishes. 107 
Despite education campaigns108 and a federal statute requiring health-care 
facilities to advise patients of their right to execute advance directives, 109 
studies consistently report that the number of individuals executing such 
documents is between 5% and 25% of the adult population.110 The reasons 
include procrastination, discomfort at confronting death, fear that such 
105. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 720,722-23 (1997). 
106. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990); 
Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 685-86 (Ariz. 1987); Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 
Cal. Rptr. 840, 852 (Ct. App. 1988); In re Tavel; 661 A.2d 1061, 1068 (Del. 1995); In re 
Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 12 (Fla. 1990); DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 
709-10 (Ky. 1993); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 756 (Md. 1992); Guardianship of Doe, 583 
N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Mass. 1992); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 409 (Mich. 1995); In re Jobes; 
529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976); In re Fiori, 673 
A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. 1996); In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445,449 (Wash. 1987); In re 
Guardianship of L.W.; 482 N.W.2d 60, 67 (Wis. l992). 
1 07. V acco v. Quill, 5 21 U.S. 793, 895 n. 9 ( 1997) (listing advance directive statutes of states). 
I 08. See, e.g., Letter from Compassion in Dying Federation to Health Care Financing 
Administration (Dec. 16, 1995) available at http://www .compassionindying.org/pain/ 
HCFAletter.html. 
109. Patients Self·Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(Q). 
110. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, 
SUBCOMMI'ITEE ON HEALTif, COMMITI'EE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
PATIENT SELF-DEfERMINA TION Acr: PROVIDERS OFFER INFORMATION ON Aov ANCE DIRECI"IVES BUT 
EFFECI'IVENESS UNCERTAIN, GAOIHEHS-95-135; AT 9 (Aug. 1995) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
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decisions may allow others to harm them, concern over legal costs, etc. 111 
Family law practitioners may assume they need not discuss such a docu-
ment(s) with clients because physicians will talk to their patients elderly or 
not about the appropriateness and efficacy of advance directives. Available 
evidence indicates most doctors do not have these conversations.112 
When the patient has no advance directive, most states have statutes that 
provide for surrogate decision making for the patient. Most of these statutes 
are hierarchic in form, providing for successive levels of decision makers. 
Typical is the Florida statute that defines the hierarchy as a judicially 
appointed guardian, spouse, majority of adult children, parents, majority 
of adult siblings, etc. 113 Nonrelated persons are rarely granted a voice in 
this process. Cohabitants whether heterosexual, gay or lesbian are often 
affected. Patients in these circumstances may well fmd medical decisions 
made by persons with whom they have had little recent contact or with 
whom they have had strong disagreements. Cohabitation agreements for 
elderly couples should be supplemented with springing durable...;power-of-
attorney and health-care-power-of-attorney documents, allowing partners 
to make medical decisions for one another when and if needed. 
Another dilenuna arising from the lack of an advance directive emerges 
when relatives are in conflict over the appropriate decision. The resulting 
bitterness may produce litigation precisely at the time when family mem-
bers are psychologically, emotionally, and fiscally least able to deal with 
the pressures of court proceedings. A cautionary tale is contained in the 
recent much-publicized Schiavo case. On February 25, 1990, Theresa 
Schiavo suffered a cardiac arrest. She has been in a persistent vegetative 
state for the past fourteen years. In 1998, her husband/guardian, petitioned 
a Florida court to withdraw artificial life support. Mrs. Schiavo's parents 
objected to the discontinuation, contesting what Mrs. Schiavo's medical 
condition was and what her wishes would have been. By now, the sixth 
year of litigation, there have been several trials, thirteen applications for 
appellate review, countless hearings on motions and petitions, three federal 
111. David Doukas; Advance Directives in Patient Care: If You Ask, They Will Tell You, 59 
AM~ FAM. PHvs. 530, 530 (1999); Linda L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care 
----+tA Case for Greater Use, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 889, 891 (1991); Greg A. Sachs et al., 
Empowerment of the Older Patient? A Randomized, Controlled Trial to Increase Discussion 
and Use of Advance Directives, 40 J. AM. GERIATRIC Soc'v 269, 272 (1992). 
112. Even where advance directives have been created, however, studies report.a large per-
centage of validly executed documents are not honored by physicians. See R. Sean Morrison et 
al., Physician Reluctance to Discuss Advance Directives: An Empiric Investigation of Potential 
Barriers, 154 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2311, 2315 (1994). See also Jo-Anne Herina 
Jeffreys, Advance Directives: Are They Worth the Paper They're Written On?, 190 N.J. LAW 
17, 17 (Apr. 1998). 
113. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 765.401 (2003). 
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district court suits, several appellate court decisions, a state statute and 
executive order, and the issuance of a gubernatorial stay to prevent the 
withholding of nutrition and hydration from Ms. Schiavo. u4 The recitation 
. . 
of this extraordinary litigation history should convince every family law 
practitioner to ensure that clients make their wishes known in a legally 
binding way and that such decisions are promptly carried out. Schiavo is 
just one of the reported cases reflecting disagreement between family 
members about end-of-life decision making. 115 
Although as yet adopted by only a few states, the Uniform Health Care 
Decisions Act116 has the potential to improve the legal situation. The act 
simplifies and facilitates the· completion of advance directives but also 
provides default procedures in the absence of an advance directive. 117 It 
allows individuals to name a surrogate decision maker in a variety of ways 118 
and recognizes oral, as well as written, instructions. 119 A legal frame-work 
for decision making on behalf of patients who have not executed documents 
or made their wishes known orally is provided; a hierarchal list, similar to 
many existing states statutes, is provided but an orally designated surrogate 
appears frrst in priority. 120 Physicians are obligated to comply with patients' 
advance directives unless they assert a conscience exception or the advance 
directive requires medically ineffective health care. 121 
IV. Institutionalization 
A~ Damage Suits Against Nursing Homes 
More than 1.7 million Americans reside in nursing homes.122 The quality 
of the care they receive is the subject of extensive administrative regulation 
114. The reported appellate decisions are: Schindler v. Schiavo, 78 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Pist. Ct. 
App,. 2001); Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Schindler v. 
Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); and Schindler v. Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
115. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Finn, 527 S.E.2d 426 (Va. 2000) (conflict between husband and 
patient's brother; Governor of Virginia petitions court to continue nutrition and hydration); In 
re Schmidt, 699 N.E.2d 1123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (conflict between husband and patient's sib-
lings); Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001) (conservator may not withhold 
artificial nutrition and hydration from a conscious but severely impaired patient absent clear and 
convincing evidence the conservator's decision is in accordance with the patient's own wishes 
or best interest). 
116. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS Acr § 1-19, UNIF. L. ANN. (2001) (hereinafter UHCDA). 
117. UHCDA § 5, 6. 
118. UHCDA § 4. 
119. ld. § 2(a). 
120. UHCDA § 2. 
121. /d. § 7(e)(t). 
122. See, e.g., Paul Emrath, Seniors' Housing: Supply & Demand; HOUSING EcoN., April 
1999, at 9. 
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and enforcement, 123 and private civil litigation. To operate, nursing homes 
must be licensed by their states; almost all participate in the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs. 124 Whether administrative regulation is effective in 
ensuring quality of care in these institutions is hotly debated. Despite 
thousands of rules and survey inspections, conditions in many nursing 
homes are deplorable. 125 
The residential nature of nursing homes and the extraordinary levels of 
disability of their populations combine to create great needs of highly vul-
nerable residents in institutional settings. In many instances, the placement 
of an individual in a nursing home is functionally involuntary; no alternative 
in the community exists. The public interest in the operation of this industry 
is readily apparent. Aside from the vulnerability of the residents, in 1995 
Medicare and Medicaid paid for 57% of all nursing-home care. 126 With the 
rapid increase in the number of the elderly, it is foreseeable that the number 
of residents and the amount spent on long-tenn-care facilities will increase 
dramatically over the coming decades. 127 If the nursing home obtains pay-
ments from Medicare or Medicaid, it must also comply with federal regula-
tions. 128 These regulations impose a minimum duty of care for the residents 
and can be used as jury instructions to establish the duty of care. 129 
Independent of administrative enforcement, civil litigation brought by, 
or on behalf of, a resident against a nursing home has increased dramati-
cally during the past two decades. The potential for this type of litigation 
has always been present, but such suits were previously rare. Now they 
have multiplied as have recoveries. 130 Juries increasingly return large 
123. The HHS has identified nursing homes as an area "of great concern." DEP'T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET REQUEST: HEARING BEFORE TilE HOUSE 
APPROPRIATIONS COMM. ON LABOR, HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 107TH CONG. (2002) (testi-
mony of Janet Rehnquist, Inspector General) available at 2002 WL 373620. 
124. To participate, nursing homes must be certified by and must enter into provider agree-
ments with the federal government. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 
No. 100-203, 101 STAT. 1330 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396(r) (2000)). 
125. In recent years, state surveys conducted in the nation's 17,000-plus nursing homes iden-
tified deficiencies that harmed residents or placed them at risk of death or serious injury in more 
than one-fourth of nursing homes nationwide. See 1999 U.S. GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, 
NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL 
QuALITY STANDARDS, GAO/HEHS-99-46 (Mar. 18, 1999). 
126. See Katherine Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 18 HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
REv. 17 (1996). 
127. See AHCA, Facts & Trends: The Nursing Facility Sourcebook 2001 vii, available at 
http://www .ahca.org/research/nfs/nfs200 1-execsum. pdf. 
128. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.1- 483.480 (2001). 
129. See Conservatorship of Gregory, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (Ct. App. 2000). 
130. The average award in nursing home negligence cases nearly doubled between 1987 and 
1994, from $238,285 to $525,853. See Thomas D. Begley, Jr., Nursing Home Law and 
Litigation, 156 N.J.L.J. 120 (1999). 
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awards against the owners and operators of nursing homes. In 2000, the 
top verdict against a nursing home was $20 million. In 2001, by contrast, 
five verdicts were higher than that, including one for $312.7 million in 
Texas. 131 Punitive damages obviously increase the size of many of these 
awards and are clustered in certain states, especially Florida, California, 
Mississippi, and Texas. 132 
These cases attract great public attention. The growing number of nurs-
ing--home cases reflects numerous factors statutory causes of action and 
attorney fees in many states, a growing elderly population, and heightened 
awareness of the plight of the elderly, particularly in institutional settings. 
Many cases revolve around dramatic incidents a single error or omission 
which produces grave injury or death. These often include patients who 
' 
are unsupervised, resulting in bums, drowning, suffocation, or strangulation. 
In contrast, habitual neglect situations, e.g., malnutrition, dehydration, and 
skin ulcers, reflect lack of care on an ongoing basis. 133 When consulted on 
these issues, the family law practitioner will have to decide whether to file 
suit or refer the case to a more specialized tort or elder abuse litigator. 
B. "Granny Cams" in Nursing Homes 
Given the condition of many nursing homes134 and studies reporting large 
and increasing amounts of elder abuse and neglect in these institutions, l35 
it is not surprising that many persons have advocated the deployment of 
video cameras to protect residents. Proponents of taping argue many work-
places use cameras to record events. 136 Videotaping can aid in prevention 
and detection of elder abuse, a crime that is seriously underreported. 137 
131. See NU Verdicts: 100 Top Verdicts of the Year, N.L.J. Litigation Services Network, Feb. 
4, 2002, available at http://www.verdictsearch.com/news/specials/0204verdicts_charts.jsp. 
132. /d. 
133. See, e.g., Sauer v. Advocate, Inc., No. CfV 2000-5 (Ark. Cir. Ct. July 27, 2001) (award-
ing $78.43 million jury ·verdict against nursing home chain to family of ninety-three-year-old 
Alzheimer's resident who died of dehydration at one of its facilities). See also Fuqua v. 
Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., No. 98-CV-1087 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2001) (awarding federal 
jury verdict of $312.7 million to estate of nursing home resident who developed numerol.ls pres-
sure sores and suffered from malnutrition at nursing home). 
134. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text. 
135. In a July 2001 report on nursing homes nationwide, the House Committee on Government 
Refonn drew this conclusion: 
Abuse of nursing home residents is a widespread and significant problem. In the last 
two years, nearly one out of every three nursing homes in the United States has been 
cited for violating federal standards established to prevent abuse. In over 1600 of the 
nursing homes cited, the violations caused actual hann to residents or placed resi-
dents in immediate jeopardy of death or serious injury. 
Tom Zucco, The Sleepless Eye, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 18, 2002, at ID. 
136. Notably banks, convenience stores, airports, and many others. ld. 
137. A California legislative committee hearing recently noted that as much as 80% of all 
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Moreover, only residents who request or consent to monitoring will have 
such devices in their rooms. 
Opponents of video cameras and other electronic monitoring in nursing 
homes warn that the presence of these devices will disturb the trusting 
., 
relationship between nursing staff and residents}38 Nursing home admin-
istrators claim neither residents nor employees want to be continuously 
filmed. 139 Insurers fear additional liability risks and lawsuits. 140 
• 
Lawyers are increasingly consulted about th·e legality and propriety of 
taping. It is unclear whether legislation is needed to operate such cameras, 
at least where the resident is not sharing a room with another person. 
Texas recently passed a law requiring nursin_g homes and related facilities 
to allow residents to install electronic monitoring devices in their rooms. 141 
Though not the only state to consider such a measure, Texas is_ the frrst to 
enact one. The use of such cameras should be discussed with the nursing 
home resident, the family, and the institution. 
C. Americans with Disabilities Act Claims 
Among the bodies of law the family practitioner must be conversant 
with today is the Americans with Disabilities Act142 (ADA). This is par~ 
ticularly relevant to elderly clients, many of whom have disabilities. The 
ADA has provided access for disabled persons to public accommodations 
and opportunities for employment previously closed to them. The ability 
to remain at home and not be inappropriately institutionalized in a nursing 
home or other facility is appropriately framed as a civil rights issue~ The 
ADA gives many opportunities for creative advocacy on behalf of clients. 
The U.S. Supreme Court's Olmstead v. L.C. rei. Zimring 143 decision held 
that the ADA prohibits states' public programs from unnecessarily institu-
tionalizing persons with disabilities. Among other things, Olmstead required 
states to have a "comprehensive, effectively working plan" for placing 
qualified individuals in less restrictive settings, and waiting lists that 
move at a "reasonable pace .. "144 States must assess whether persons have 
been inappropriately placed in state institutions, nursing homes, and other 
elder abuse goes unreported. See ELDER AND DEPENDENT ADULT ABUSE: TRAINING TO IDENTIFY 
FINANCIAL ABUSE: HEARING ON A.B. 109 BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., CAL. 
ASSEMBLY 109, 2001-2002 REG. SESS. (Cal. 2001). 
138. See Charles H. Roadman II, Surveillance Cameras in Resident Rooms, AHCA NEws 
RELEASE, (Aug. 1, 2000), available at http://www.ahca.org/brief/080100.htm. 
139. See Jessica Rappaport, 4Gtanny Cams' Under Surveillance, TECH TV (Apr. 15, 2002) 
available at http://www ;tech tv .com/news/culture/story/0,24195 ,33 79593 ,OO.htm. 
140. See Roadman, supra note 138. 
141. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.847(a) (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2002). 
142. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 et seq~ (1995 &. West Supp. 2000). 
143. 527 u.s. 581 ( 1999). 
144. Jd. at 605-06. 
Representing Elders in the Family Law Practice 235 
facilities. The Medicaid program is critical. Not only do these state programs 
receive and provide major funding for both institutional and home and 
community-based services, but also eligible individuals have a legal enti-
tlement to receive appropriate statutory services. 145 States must administer 
"services, programs and activities [e.g., Medicaid] in the most integrated 
setting appropriate to the needs" of disabled persons. 146 In addition, many 
states make the "medically needy" individuals who fit into a federal bene-
fit program category, such as the aged, blind, or disabled, ·but whose income 
' 
or resources are above the eligibility levels for the benefit program-eligible 
for Medicaid. 147 These persons can qualify if their income, minus incurred 
medical expenses, is less than the state's income and resource levels. 148 
Medicaid '·'waivers" allow states to avoid compliance with otherwise 
applicable federal laws and to provide services to persons at home or in 
the community, avoiding placement in a hospital or nursing home. 149 To 
this end, waivers can be used to provide services nortnally unavailable to 
Medicaid beneficiaries, including case management, homemaker/home 
health aides, personal care, adult day-care, health, habilitation and respite 
care. 150 Medicaid waiver programs offer great opportunities, but many 
problems need attention from family law practitioners. States have enjoyed 
almost unchecked flexibility in how they administer their home and com-
munity-based services. In many states, for example, beneficiaries have 
been placed on waiting lists, sometimes for years. These waiting lists violate 
the statutory requirement that "assistance shall be furnished with reasonable 
promptness to all eligible individuals."151 Another Medicaid requirement, 
the "free choice" provision, provides that when a state covers both insti-
tutional and waiver program services, it must inform eligible individuals 
about feasible alternatives, if available under the waiver. Individuals have 
145. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (Supp. 2000). 
146. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794 as implemented by 28 C.P.R.§ 35.130(d) and§ 41.51(d). 
14 7. See 42 U .S.C.A. § 1396a (Supp. 2000). The following jurisdictions have medically 
needy programs: California, Connecticut~ District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Vennont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginian, and Wisconsin. 
148. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17) (Supp. 2000). 
149. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c); 42 C.F.R. § 440.180 et seq. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1396a(a)(21) ("[l]f the State plan includes medical assistance in behalf of individuals 65 years 
of age or older who are patients in public institutions for mental diseases, [a State plan formed-
ical assistance must] show that the State is making satisfactory pre>gress toward developing and 
implementing a comprehensive mental health program, including provision for utilization of 
community mental health centers, nursing facilities, and other alternatives to care in public 
institutions for mental diseases"). 
150. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.180 (1999). 
151. 42 U .S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(8) (Supp. 2000). See also 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 ("agency must: 
(a) furnish Medicaid promptly to recipients without any delay caused by the agency's adminis-
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the right to choose whether they will receive care under the waiver program 
or in an institutional setting_l52 
Many states have failed to implement effectively their waiver programs, 
chiefly because of cost concerns. This should be challenged. To receive 
federal reimbursement, waiver services must be at least "cost neutral," 
i.e., the average per capita cost of home care may not exceed the average 
per capita cost to Medicaid of institutional care. 153 Moreover, the quality 
of care and quality of life at home is likely to be better than in an institution. 
Yet in fiscal year 2000, 73% of Medicaid's long-term care funds were 
spent for institutionalized persons; only 27% went to provide services in 
the community. 154 Numerous suits have been brought to rectify this imbal-
ance; 155 many more should be filed. 
V. Grandparent-Grandchildren Relationships 
A. The Role of Grandparents 
Historically, the extended family has been common in American society 
and grandparents have always played a prominent role. Today that role is 
greater than ever. Based on current life expectancy, Americans can expect to 
spend about half of their life in the role of grandparent. 156 In single-parent 
households, as well as in the increasingly two-job traditional two-parent 
family, third persons are often aske,d to assist in everyday tasks of child 
rearing and to assume a share of the financial, psychological, and emo-
tional role of parents. Grandparents have always been, and are even more 
so today, family members who meet these needs. Moreover, grandparents 
are increasingly facing the challenge of raising their children's children. 
Between 1990 and 2000 there was a 30% increase in children living in 
grandparent-headed households from 3.5 million in 1990 to 4.5 million 
in 2000. 157 At least 1.5 million children now live in a household where 
neither parent is present and the grandparent is the primary caregiver. 158 
trative procedures; [and] (b) continue to furnish Medicaid regularly to all eligible individuals 
until they are found to be ineligible . ~ .")/d. § 435.911 ("agency must establish time standards 
for determining eligibility and infonn the applicant of what they are-"). 
152. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(2) (Supp. 2000); 42 C.F.R. § 441.302(d) (1999). 
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 n(2)(D). 
154. Fiscal Year 2002 Data, compiled by the MEDST AT Group, available at http://www. 
cms.gov/ (last visited March 17,-2004) ( '02 institutional expenditures, $57.41 billion; commu-
nity expenditures, $24.72 billion). 
155. See, e.g., Consent Decree, Flores, et al., v. Huphreys,. et al., Cause No. 49D02-0007-
CP0971 (entered Feb. 18, 2004) Marian Co. (lnd) Superior Ct.; see also, Clarence Sundstrom; 
Strategies for Implementing Olmstead Directives. VICTIMIZATION OF ELDERLY AND DISABLED, 
55-56 (Nov.-Dec. 2001) (discussing numerous cases). 
156. Ellen Marrus, Over the Hills and Through the Woods to Grandparent's House We Go: 
Or Do We, Post Troxel, 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 751, 759 (2001). 
157. ld. 
158. Ken Bryson & Lynne M. Casper, Coresident Grandparents and Grandchildren, U.S .. 
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Grandparents can be positive influences on grandchildren in many 
ways. 159 What matters to a child is the presence of a sensitive, loving adult 
who provides the child with a sense of security, stability, and physical and 
psychological well-being. 160 Many experts believe the grandparent/grand-
child relationship is uniquely significant to children, providing them with 
emotional security and valuable role models. 161 In addition to one-on-one 
contact with the child, grandparents interact with and support the grand-
child's parents,162 transmit values,163 mediate between parents and children 
and rescue families in trouble. 164 Children often reside with or are taken 
care of by grandparents after their parents divorce or separate. 165 
Bureau of the Census, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p23-198.pdf. Press 
Release, AARP, Grandparents Face Challenges Raising Grandchildren (New York) available 
at, http://www .aarp.org/states/ny/Articles/a2003-06-24-ny-grandparents.html. 
159. A recent AARP Grandparenting Survey (The AARP Grandparenting Survey: The sharing 
and caring between mature grandparents and their grandchildren) explored many facets of the 
grandparent-grandchild relationship including communications, grandparent roles, activities, 
spending patterns, relationships, and values. AARP conducted a national survey of 823 grand par-
ents age fifty and older found that 82% of grandparents had seen a grandchild in the past month, 
85% had talked to a grandchild on the telephone, and 53% had sent a grandchild a greeting card. 
Also within the last month, about seven in ten had shared a meal with a grandchild, half had 
watched a television comedy or had their grandchild spend the night, and about four in ten shopped 
for clothes, took part in exercise or sports, watched educational television, attended a religious serv-
ice, or watched a video. Fifty percent of grandparents say they frequently play the role of friend or 
companion for a grandchild. When asked to rate their relationship with one grandchild, chosen ran-
domly by the computer, grandparents gave an average rating of 8.7 on a 10-point scale. AARP 
Grandparenting Survey, available at http://research.aarp.org/genera1/grandpsurv .html. 
160. Shelley A. Riggs, Response to Troxel v. Granville: Implications of Attachment theory for 
Judicial Decisions Regarding Custody and Third-Party Visitation , 41 FAM. CT. REv. 39,45 (2003). 
161. ARTHUR KORNHABER & KENNETII L. WOODWARD, GRANDPARENTS/GRANDCHILDREN: THE 
VITAL CoNNECI"ION 55 (1981). One psychological study, which focused specifically on the ties 
between grandparent and grandchild, found that grandchildren who maintained close contact 
with their grandparents were more at ease with the elderly, generally more emotionally secure, 
and less likely to be abused or become dependent on drugs. See Rebecca Brown, Comment, 
Grandparent Visitation and the Intact Family, 16 S. IlL U. L.J. 133, 133 (1991). Vincent K. 
Adkins, Grandparents as a National Asset: A Brief Note, 24(1) ACTIVITIES, ADAPTATION & 
AGING, 13-18 (1999). 
162. Riggs , supra note 160, at 45. 
163. Values grandparents say they most want to pass on to their grandchildren are morals or 
integrity ( 42o/o ), success or ambition (21% ), or religion (20% ). Riggs, supra note 160, at 45. 
164. Marrus, supra note 156, at 758. This article lists some of the values present in the grand-
child/grandparent relationship as: 
Transmission of values from one generation to another; ... serving as arbitrators 
between parents and children concerning values that are central to family continuity 
and individual enhancement. ... [G]randchildren ... perceive their grandparents as influ-
ential in their value development. Furthennore, studies have shown that grandparents 
can have "as much (if not more) influence upon the developing child as the child's own 
parents." The mediating role that grandparents, particularly grandmothers, often take 
on between the mother and child can indeed improve the mother/child relationship./d. 
165. Riggs, supra note 160, at 45. More than one third of parents and three quarters of their 
children will likely reside in a grandparent's home during or after a divorce./d. 
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B. Visitation 
Under common law doctrine, parents detennined whether grandparents 
(or others) could have a relationship with their children. Unfettered parental 
autonomy in these matters was based on the idea that parents ordinarily 
act in the child's best interest.166 That power was bolstered by a long 
series of Supreme Court decisions recognizing a parent's right to direct 
the upbringing of his or her child as a fundamental liberty interest under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 167 Responding to rising divorce rates and 
other dramatic changes in American family life, all states passed statutes 
in the 1960s and 1970s recognizing the rights of third parties especially 
grandparents to participate in children's lives. These statutes typically 
named specific classes of individuals who may petition a court to detetmine 
if visitation is in the child's best interest. 168 Although there were contrary 
decisions, 169 most state courts upheld the constitutionality of these third-
party-visitation statutes against challenges by parents. 170 
The United States Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Troxel v. 
Granville111 reversed this trend, but its implications remain cloudy. Nine 
Supreme Court Justices wrote six opinions, appearing as divided as the 
family that litigated the case. The plurality opinion found the challenged 
Washington visitation statute "breathtakingly broad" and failed to accord 
deference to the parent's constitutionally protected autonomy: 172 
The decision whether . . . an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in 
any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit parent's 
decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the Court must 
accord at least some special weight to the parent's own detennination. 173 
166. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (Child's "interest is inextricably 
linked with the parents' interest"). 
167. E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating "[i]t is cardinal with us 
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function 
and freedom includes preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder"); Wis. 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (explaining that "the primary role of the parents in the 
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradi-
tion" ); H. L. v. Mathieson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) ("[W]e have recognized that parents have 
a "guiding role" to play in the upbringing of their children, which presumptively includes coun-
seling them on important decisions") (citation omitted). 
168. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1993) (grandparents who can demonstrate ''sub-
stantial relationship with grandchildren"); Mo. ConE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1999); GA. 
CoDE ANN.§ 19-7-3 (c) (West 1999) (visitation to be granted if in "best interests of child"). 
169. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993). 
170. The "vast majority of courts that have addressed the constitutionality of grandparent visi-
tation statutes authorizing visitation if in the best interest of the child have upheld those statutes 
as constitutional." Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 644 n18 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing 
cases). See also, e.g. , King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992) cert. denied 506 U.S. 941 (1992). 
171. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
172. /d. at 69-70. 
173. /d. at 70. 
• 
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The "special weight" to be given a parent's decision-making in future 
cases was, probably purposely, left ambiguous in the plurality's "as 
applied" constitutional analysis. The checkered pattern of subsequent 
cases challenging existing state visitation statutes attests to the lack of 
consensus by state courts regarding the precise meaning of Troxe/}74 
Some state appellate courts have found existing state statutes facially 
unconstitutional when no question was raised about the fitness of the par-
ent.175 Others, taking Justice O'Connor's suggestion, 176 have essentially 
rewritten grandparent visitation statutes to include more rigorous require-
ments before a trial court could overrule a parent's right to decide visitation 
issues. 177 In other states, legislatures have redrafted their statutes to nar-
row the opportunity for courts to order visitation. 178 
Yet grandparents with significant relationships with grandchildren are not 
without hope. Maintaining that relationship which is separate and distinct 
from that of parents and child179 is often in a grandchild's best interests. 180 
Som_e recent decisions have acknowledged a child's right to continue such 
relationships. A New York family court observed: 
174. See Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applications of Troxel v. Granville and the 
Court's Reluctance to Declare Grandparent Visitation Statutes Unconstitutional, 41 FAM. CT 
REv. 14-38 (2003) (analyzing ten cases decided by state supreme courts in eight states since the 
Troxel decision. Three state courts declared grandparent visitation statutes unconstitutional as 
applied. One decision found the statute unconstitutional on its face, three found their state 
statutes facially constitutional, and one reached the same result regarding a visitation statute that 
applied only in cases of divorce). 
175. See, e.g., Wicham v. Bern, 769 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002); Linderv. Linder, 72 S.W.3d 841 (Ark. 
2002) (mother's unfitness to decide grandparent visitation did not equate to unfitness to parent). 
176. Troxel, supra note 171, at 72-73. 
177. See, e.g., Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002) (party seeking visitation must 
establish parent-like relationship and show denial of visitation would cause harm to child con-
templated by neglect/dependency statutes). 
178. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CooE § 14-09-05.1 (2002) (specific finding needed that visitation 
will not interfere with parent-child relationship, and removing presumption that grandparent 
visitation is in the best interest of the child); OR. REv. STAT. § I 09.119 (2001) (petitioner must 
overcome presumption that legal parent acts in best interest in the child by clear and convinc-
ing evidence); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 36-6-306 (2001) (finding of danger of substantial harm to 
child needed before hearing required on petition for visitation). 
179. See Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199, 204-05 (N.J. 197 5) ("[ v ]is its with a grandparent are 
often a precious part of a child's experience and there are benefits which devolve upon the grand-
child from the relationship with his grandparents which he cannot derive from any other rela-
tionship"). See also ARTHUR KORNHABER & SONDRA FORSYTH, GRANDPARENT POWER (1994); 
Christine Davik-Galbraith, Note, "Grandma, Grandpa, Where Are You?"- Putting the F oct,ts of 
Grandparent Visitation Statutes on the Best Interests of the Child, 3 ELDER L.J. 143 ( 1995). 
180. Dr. Arthur Kornhaber has noted that the consequences of denying a grandchild a rela-
tionship with their grandparents is "[t]o deny children access to their heritage and to prevent 
them from carrying that legacy into the future is a grave error which inflicts profound psycho-
logical wounds on all concerned." Nicole E. Miller, The Best Interests of All Children: An 
Examination of Grandparent Visitation Rights Regarding Children Born Out of Wedlock, 42 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 179, 191-92 (1998) (quoting KORNHABER & FORSYTH, supra note 179). 
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This Court views the New York Legislature, and many of the comments in 
Troxel, as telling parents and grandparents alike that, given the apparent disap-
pearance of the traditional family, children's best interests require the opportu-
nity for participation by siblings and grandparents to be sure that the moral 
obligations of familial relationships are carried out. What used to be known as 
the common law is not so common any more. Non-biologic care givers are 
assuming previous strictly parental roles more and more frequently. 181 
In another case, the court noted: 
The historical development of family law in America, and the expansion of 
individual constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of the United States and 
the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, give foundation to a holding 
that a child has a constitutional right to maintain contact with a person with 
whom the child has developed a parent-like relationship. Accompanying that 
right, is also a right to the equal protection of the laws. This requires that the 
child have the due process necessary to claim his right. This claim can be given 
constitutional protection, while at the same time giving due recognition, respect 
and protection to a parent's constitutional right to the custody, care and control 
of his or her child. 182 
On a more basic level, lawsuits between grandparents and parents 
regarding visitation obviously reflect enorrnous tension and conflict within 
these families. The adversarial nature of these cases, and the generally 
winner-take-all result, should lead family lawyers to consider their role 
thoughtfully in these situations. This type of litigation may well produce 
serious harm for the child. Additionally, the very length of these cases is 
often an additional detriment. The bitter dispute in Troxel between the 
mother and the grandparents regarding visitation with the daughters of the 
deceased husband proceeded through the trial court twice and through 
three levels of appellate review. The litigation lasted seven years. And in 
another high-profile grandparent parent case, the O.J. Simpson contest 
took more than five years of trial and appellate review and ended only 
after a negotiated settlement. 183 
What can we deduce from these examples? Troxel resembles "high 
conflict" child custody and visitation contests between divorcing parents, 
181. Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S. 2d 503,507 (Fam. Ct., 2000). See also In re Paternity 
of Roger D.H., 641 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002); Giljour v. Harris, 795 So. 2d 350, 358 
(La. App. Ct. 2001). 
182. Webster v. Ryan, 729 N.Y.S.2d 315, 341 (Fam. Ct. 2001). 
183. The Browns appealed and won a reversal and remand based on procedural and eviden-
tiary errors by the trial court. Guardianship of Sydney Simpson, et al., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 
(App. Ct. 1998). Before a second custody trial, the parties negotiated a settlement, essentially 
reiterating the initial trial court decision. Juditha Brown was prompted to drop the custody fight 
at the urging of the children, who asked her to let them stay with their father. Hector Becerra, 
Simpson's Former In-Laws Agree to Let Children Stay With Him Settlement, Los ANGELES 
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2000, at B3. 
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generally agreed by family lawyers and judges to be damaging to all con-
cerned. 184 The contentiousness between parents ending their relationship 
is often present in grandparent visitation disputes. The parent may be 
motivated not by the child's best interest but by hostility to the family of 
the estranged partner or spouse. The characters in these human dramas 
find their lives probed by partisan experts; old incidents and wounds are 
revisited by opposing counsel in the courtroom, in pleadings, and in dep-
ositions. These lawsuits exact an enormous toll upon all participants. In a 
grandparent p-arent visitation case, a New York court observed that the 
case presented a ''tragedy in human interpersonal relationships which is 
basically beyond purview of the law."185 Another court examining extended 
litigation over grandparent visitation commented: 
We can only wonder how courts are to detennine when visitation has been 
unreasonably denied where, as here, a parent and adult child have become so 
' 
estranged that they can not communicate and act only to hurt one another. We can 
only wonder what business courts have getting into such intra-family disputes.186 
Mediation or other less fonnal means of dispute resolution may well be 
better alternatives. A trained mediator encourages the parties to listen to 
one another, communicate their needs, and to explore alternatives and 
accommodations to reach a consensual decision on issues relating to chil-
dren. Cooperation and compromise may resolve some or all of the issues 
that separate the parties, or at least narrow the gap so that attorneys may 
negotiate a settlement of the remaining issues.187 Results of these processes 
include higher settlement rates and reduced court congestion, which 
enable courts to spend greater time on remaining cases. 188 
184. "Amidst all this potential conflict there is a child. There can be no doubt that children 
survive divorce, and sometimes they do remarkably well. Yet, at the very least the parent's 
divorce is a trying time for the child, and at most it can cause life-long trauma." PETER N. 
SWISHER, H. ANTHONY MILLER & lANA B. SINGER, FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS 1093 (2d ed. 1998); "When a custody dispute goes to court, it is often bitterly fought. 
In the midst of the battling over their own rights, it is easy for parents to lose track of their chil-
dren's needs and interests." HARRY D. KRAusE, LINDA D. ELROD, ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, 
COMMENTS AND QuESTIONS 629 (4th ed. 1998). 
185. Doe v. Smith, 595 N.Y.S.2d 624,627 (1993). 
186. Komosa v. Komosa, 939 S.W.2d 479, 482 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
187. Linda Silbennan & Andrew Schepard, Consultants Comments on the New York State 
Law Revision Recommendation on the Child Custody Dispute Resolution Process, 19 CoLo. 
J~L. AND Soc. PRoss. 399, 407 (1985). 
188. Jay Folberg, Mediation of Child Custody Disputes, 19 CoLo. J.L. AND Soc. PRoss. 413, 
423 (1985). (Jurisdictions, such as San Francisco, that require mediation report settlement rates 
as high as 90%; 86% settlement rate in Dade County, Florida, and more than 54% in Los 
Angeles County). Thirty-three states have statutes or court rules that mandate mediation in con-
tested custody and visitation cases. Peter Salem & Ann L. Milne, Making Mediation Work in a 
Domestic Violence Case, 17 FAM. Aovoc. 34 (1995). 
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VI. Elder Abuse & Neglect 
Elder abuse and neglect is surely an unpleasant topic-, but one that must 
be confronted by family law practitioners. Although no frrm data on the 
actual amount of mistreatment exists, the number of elderly adults abused 
each year is believed to be between 1.5 and 2 million.189 Only one in eight 
cases is actually reported to authorities; much mistreatment occurs within 
the family, and the elderly person is often simultaneously embarrassed by 
the abuse, fearful of future mistreatment and, paradoxically, protective of 
the abuser. 190 This "hidden problem'' often affects persons with limited 
contact with outsiders. 191 
Elder maltreatment often has a devastating impact on victims. Because 
of their age, health, or limited resources, victims typically have few 
options for resolving or avoiding abusive situations. Their physical frailty 
makes them more vulnerable to physical or other abuse, and poor health 
often accentuates the problem.192 Older persons may be less able to recover 
from financial exploitation because of fixed incomes or a short remaining 
life span. The loss of a home lived in for many years ·may be particularly 
traumatic because of its familiarity, memories, and the trauma of being 
moved. It is no surprise that abuse and neglect correlate with a higher 
death rate. Studies have shown mistreated elders are 3.1 times more like-
ly to die than their nonmistreated counterparts. 193 Elder abuse and neglect 
is as dangerous to the health and well-being of older adults as many 
chronic diseases associated with death and disability.194 
Although there are many different statutory and judicial definitions of 
189. SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH & LONG-TERM CARE OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 
10lST CONG., ELDER ABUSE: A DECADE OF SHAME AND lNACI'lON, XI (Comm. Print 1990) [here-
inafter 1990 ELDER ABUSE HousE REPORT] (estimating more than 1.5 million persons may be 
victims of such abuse each year and the number is rising). See 1990 National Center on Elder 
Abuse, The National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, pt. 5, Conclusions, available at http://www. 
aoa.gov/abuse/report/H-Conclusions.htrill (hereinafter NEAIS). See-also Karl Pillemer & David 
Moore, Highlights from a Study of Abuse of Patients in Nursing Homes, 2 J. ELDER ABUSE & 
NEGLEcr 5, 18-19 (1990) (finding 36% of all nursing home personnel reported seeing at least 
one_ incident of physical abuse by staff members; 40% admitted committing psychological 
abuse in the past year). 
190. See, e.g., Jordan Kosberg & Daphne Nahmiash, Characteristics of Victims and 
Perpetrators and Milieus of Abuse and Neglect; in ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION OF 
OLDER PERSONS: STRATEGIES FOR Ass·ESSMENT & INTERVENTION 31 (L. Baumhover and S.C. 
Beall eds., 1996). 
191. /d.at32. 
192. Although it would be inaccurate to describe the vast population ·over sixty-five with one 
generalization, physical decline eventually becomes an aspect of the aging process. See gener-
ally D. TOMB, GROWING OLD 15-40 (1984). Chronic health problems increase dramatically in 
this age group. R. ATCHLEY, SOCIAL FORCE & AGING 91 ( 1988). 
193. See MarkS. Lachs et al., The Mortality of Elder Mistreatment, 280 JAMA 428 (1998). 
194. See id. 
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financial abuse,-it generally consists of the illegal or improper use of an 
elder's assets, e.g., theft, fraud, and breach of fiduciary or caregiver duty. 
A.t most, only one out of every five financial abuse cases is reported. 195 
Though the reasons for financial abuse may vary, the fact that persons 
over the age of fifty-five control at least 70% of the nation's household net 
worth reflects its target. 196 There is also an important gender issue. Many 
older women have never handled their own financial affairs, depending on 
their husband for that function. While learning to manage their resources, 
they are often an inviting target. 
Lawyers are in a strategic position to identify and repair financial 
abuse, especially by family members. At least five states require attorneys 
to report any reasonable belief that financial abuse has occurred. 197 
Lawyers often draft ,durable powers of attorney and create and administer 
guardianships, trusts,· and other instruments-. 198 As a result, attorneys are 
often in a position to warn clients about the possibility, or actual misuse, 
of these legal devices. Warning signs of financial exploitation include: 
dramatic changes in withdrawal patterns; unusual checks written to cash; 
signatures that do not appear genuine; a decrease in a senior's s,pending; 
unpaid bills after a long history of prompt payment. 
VII. Ethical Issues in Representing the Elder·ly 
A. Identifying the Client 
Often the lawyer is contacted not by the older person, but by a, son, 
daughter or other relative. These family members are frequently involved 
in advising, assisting, and even directing financial and practical arrange-
195. NEAIS, supra note 189, at 4. 
196. Kemper Funds Study Reveals Investors over Age 55 Control Nation's Wealth,-SENIOR 
JouRNAL. COM, June 26, 2000 available at http://www.seniorjoumal.com/NEWS/2000%20Files/ 
J une%2000/FI'R -6-26- OOSnrsCntrlWlth.htm~ 
197. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 46-454(B) (West 2000) (attorneys in some roles have a duty to 
report); MoNT. CoDE ANN.§ 52-3- 811(3)(t) {2000); NEv. REv. STAT.§ 200.5093 (1999); OHIO 
REv. CODE ANN.§ 5101.61A (Anderson 2000); TEX. HuM. RES. CoDE ANN.§ 48.051 {Vernon 
2000). See also DEL. CooE ANN. TIT. 31, § 3910 (1999) (requiring any person with a reasonable 
belief that abuse is occurring to report); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 415.1034(1) (West 2000) (requiring 
any person having knowledge of abuse to report); Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 209.030(2) (Michie 
2000) (requiring any person having reasonable cause to suspect abuse to report); N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 16l-F:46 (1999) (requiring any person suspecting or believing abuse has occurred or is 
occurring to report); ·N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27- 7-30 (Michie 2000) (requiring any person having 
reasonable cause to believe abuse is occurring to report); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 43A, § 10-104 
(West 2000) (requiring any person with reasonable cause to believe abuse is occurring to report). 
198. One-of the issues that a principal should consider when executing a financial durable 
power is whether to include a power to make gifts. This type of power is frequently granted in 
financial durable powers of attorney. The grant of such a power should be made with great cau-
tion. See generally Hans A. Lapping, Note, License to Steal: Implied Gift-Giving Authority and 
Powers _of Attorney, 4 ELDER L.J. 143 ( 1996). 
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ments for care of the aged relative. The elderly person may not even be 
present at the interview. If present, the elderly person typically is accom-
panied by one or more younger family members who provides the docu-
mentation or infortnation the attorney needs about the senior citizen or his 
property. 199 Bankbooks, mortgage documents, financial statements, tax 
returns, etc., may well be under the control of the relative. There may, of 
course, be a conflict of interest between the child and the parent, and if it 
is evident initially, the attorney must quickly decide who the client is and 
explain completely and openly to other family members the limitations 
this will impose. A written retainer agreement may be a practical way of 
clarifying the client's identity or a letter to other family members clearly 
stating that the lawyer is not representing them. 
An attorney has the duty to maintain complete confidentiality regarding 
ahnost all client disclosures.200 When the client is the senior, he or she should 
be inforrned that confidentiality is waived if a child or another family 
member is present during the interview, reads mail from or to the attorney, 
or is invited to participate in other ways. Asking the accompanying family 
member to wait in another room while the attorney meets privately with 
the senior client may immediately produce an awkward situation for those 
not familiar with attorney-client privilege. 
B. Joint Representation 
As an alternate solution, the lawyer may be asked to represent multiple 
clients, including the aged person, who have "sought the services of one 
lawyer to help them resolve differences or execute a transaction between 
or among themselves. A key factor in defining the relationship is whether the 
parties share responsibility for the lawyer's fee, but common representation 
may be inferred from other circumstances."201 When the lawyer acts as an 
interrnediary, he or she must obtain inforn1ed consent from each client 
after having explained the advantages and disadvantages of common rep-
resentation. That may be difficult with an aged, dependent family member. 
Independent of that consent, the lawyer must reasonably believe that 
the matter can be resolved on tern1s compatible with clients' best interests, 
that each client is competent to make informed decisions in the matter, 
and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of 
the clients.202 While acting as an inter1nediary, the lawyer must be impartial 
199. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON McCHRYSTAL BARNES, ELDER LAW: CASES & 
MATERIALS 60 (2d ed. 1999). 
200. MODEL RULES OF PRoF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1998) (hereinafter, MODEL RULES). 
201. MoDEL RULES R. 2.2. The comment states that "a lawyer acts as intennediary under this 
rule when the lawyer represents two or more parties with potentially conflicting interest." 
202. E.g ., can the attorney fulfill his or her obligation to each individual including loyalty 
Representing Elders in the Family Law Practice 245 
as to the competing interests of the individual clients. If there is any conflict 
in this intergenerational representation, the attorney must make a choice 
of whom to represent and infortn all parties. This often will be difficult for 
an attorney contemplating future legal work as ex,ecutor or attorney for the 
estate or future representation of younger family members. All rights to 
confidentiality and attorney/client privilege must be waived as between 
the clients involved in the intermediation, although commentary to Rule 
2.2 suggests that it may be possible to preserve some limited rights.203 
C. Payment of Fees 
If the family member, typically a child, is paying the parent's attorney 
fees, that infortnation must be disclosed and appropriate consent obtained.204 
The assets of many aged persons e.g., retirement accounts or equity in a 
mortgaged home-· ~are often unavailable quickly or without substantial 
changes in personal and living arrangements. The duty of loyalty is impaired, 
however, if the attorney gives priority to another's interests, such as those 
of the payer of the fee, thus rendering the lawyer unable to advocate effec-
tively for the client. 
D. Capacity 
A particularly sensitive matter in dealing with elderly clients is assess-
ment of the capacity of the elderly relative to make decisions. Often a 
decision about whether to seek guardianship may be the triggering event 
that brings the family member, and perhaps the elderly parent, to the 
lawyer's office. Determining the degree of mental impair1nent that must be 
present to predict an individual's need for assistance is difficult for most 
lawyers.205 Legal capacity varies according to the decision to be made. 
(i.e., avoiding conflicts of interest (MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980) 
[hereinafter MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES R. 1. 7); cOmpetency and diligence (MODEL CODE 
Canon 6 ( 1980); MODEL RULES R. 1.1 ); zealous advocacy (MODEL CODE EC 7 ( 1980); MODEL 
RULES R. 1.1 & 1.2). Is communication sufficient to enable the client to make infonned deci-
sions about the representation? MODEL CoDE EC 7-8 (1980); MODEL RULES R. 1.4. 
203. The comment to Rule 2.2 provides: A particularly important factor in detennining the 
appropriateness of intermediation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-
client privilege. In a common representation, the lawyer is still required both to keep each client 
adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality of infonnation related to the representation. 
See MODEL RULES R. 1.4 and 1.6 (1998). ATIORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES§ 
4:36 (1993). 
204. A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that 
fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the 
client." MODEL RULES R. 1.7. See also MODEL RULES R. 1.8(f)(l). 
205. The following standard was proposed by THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY 
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING 
HEALTHCARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATION OF INFORMED CONSENT IN 'ffiE 
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VIII. Conclusion 
Family law practice and the elderly intersect at many points. The top-
ics discussed in this essay are by no means exhaustive; numerous other 
issues could have been analyzed. The legal needs of the elderly implicate 
numerous bodies of substantive and procedural law. Even mundane day-
to-day matters such as the older person's driving privileges present legal 
and interpersonal challenges. 
Effective lawyers seek to maximize the probability of achieving client 
objectives while minimizing legal risks and costs. In representing elderly 
persons, traditional lawyering skills interviewing, counseling, planning, 
drafting, etc. are critical. Even the best planning and implementation 
often will require monitoring and alteration as circumstances change. Our 
challenge as family law practitioners is to grow in skill and knowledge to 
meet the needs of our older clients and their families. 
PATIENT-PRACI'ITIONER RELATIONSHIP 57-62 (1982): 
Decision making capacity requires, to a lesser or greater degree: (1) possession of a set 
of values and goals; (2) the ability to communicate and to understand infonnation; and 
(3) the ability to reason and to deliberate about one's choices. An emotional state con-
sistent with the task also is required. 
